
Cuba: Unresolved

By Roscoe Drummond

Time for New Action

WHEN John J. McCone, director of the Central Intelli- were more than 100 per cent

tagon combined are unable to convince the prevestigating aub-committee of the Senate test Soviet of fensive weap. ons have been with drawn



Drummond

from Cuba. something needs to be done about It.

I believe that something can be done. Before attempting to suggest one course of action. I want to point up the Central findings of the Stennis committee and to examine whether these findings are supported by responsible,

fair-minded men.

ifter taking exhaustive, seerac testimony from the entire intelligence community of the Government, including State, Defense, and the Joint Uniels of Staff, plus more than 70 nonofficial witnesses, the Senate committee unanimously concluded: "Strategic wcapons may or may nat be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because : of lack of evidence."

ALL OF THE WITNESSES and all of the testimony from the Administration said just the opposite-that strategic missiles and offensive weapons have been removed. But the Stennis committee was umpersuaded. It has grave doubts that it is true.

The committee has grave doubts not only because the evidence of withdrawai is inconclusive, but also because our own past surveillance had these serious shortcom-

There were several "substantial errors" in evaluating the intelligence because top officials were "subjectively" convinced that the Soviets wouldn't try to put missiles in Cuba.

Not until long after their arrival, not until after the President had spoken on Oct. were in Cuba.

Even into late October we gence Agency, and all of the off in our estimates of the intelligence chiefs of the Pen-

There is inadequate inforniation today on the number of Soviet troops leaving Cuba and the number arriving. "Some sources estimate that as many as 40,000 Soviets are now in Cuba."

With these doubts in mind, the Scnate committee reports

as follows:

"To a man the intelligence chiefs stated that it is their opinion that all strategic missiles and bombers have beeen removed from Cuba. However, they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite possible that offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves and otherwise. They also admitted that absolute assurance on this question can come from penetrating and continuing onsite inspection by reliable obgervers and that, based on skepticism, if nothing more, there is reason for grave concern about the matter.

WHEN A SENATE committee, reaching this conclusion, is predominantly manned by such able and objective people as Democratic Sens. John Stennis (Miss.), Stuart Symington (Mo.), Henry Jackson (Wash.) and Republican Sens., Leverett Saltonstall (Mass.) and Margaret Chase Smith (Maine), it cannot be ignored.

Why shouldn't President Kennedy renew his urgent exchanges with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to establish the on-site inspection. which the Premier himself proposed?

If the offensive weapons have been removed-as stated -and if Soviet troops are to be withdrawn, as promised,

then on site inspection should be welcome to Moscow.

Unless Cubsn Premier Fidel Castro, in objecting to on-site inspection, is doing exactly what Moscow wants, he is now in no position to re-fuse to fulfill Khrushchev's promise to President Kennedy.

The time is opportune to reopen the inspection issue and to reopen it with urgency.

I think most Americans will agree with the Stennis committee's unanimous ap-

"The entire Cuban problem, both military and political, should be accorded the highest priority by our governmental officials to the end that the evil threat which the Soviet occupation of Cuba represents will be eliminated at an early date."

C 1963, New York Herald Tribune, Inc

42, did we confirm that Savicor Release 2004/12/15 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000700380016-0